In this guest contribution, Simonas Kairys, Deputy Parliamentary Group Chair and Former Minister of Culture (Liberalų sąjūdis, LT) reflects on soft power and security strategies.
What is the purpose of security strategies? A global power, such as the US, tends to use its security strategy primarily to define and consolidate its global leadership.
However, rather than emphasising an ambition to dominate the world or to defend a values-based international world order grounded in liberal democracy and free-market principles, President Donald Trump's US National Security Strategy signals a turn inward.
It focuses on US society itself, on shaping national interests and on engaging with global affairs only ‘if only their activities directly threaten our interests’. This marks a significant shift, one that has generated considerable concern, particularly among countries like Lithuania or other Baltic states.
By contrast, a country like Russia employs its security strategy not to justify defensive measures, but to legitimise aggression and war. Although Putin’s regime harbours imperial ambitions, it lacks the capacity to dominate the world.
It markets concepts such as the Russian world, the protection of Russian-speaking populations and the preservation of Soviet heritage abroad – portraying them as threatened and using this to justify military aggression. Russia’s security strategy will be examined in greater detail in the next section.
Conversely, Lithuania uses its National Security Strategy neither to consolidate global leadership nor to justify military aggression. For Lithuania, it is essential to raise its profile effectively so that societies in partner countries have no reservations about deploying allied troops or providing other forms of security guarantees.
States like Lithuania have a vital interest in preserving a rules- and values-based international order, as this is the only viable framework for ensuring the survival of an independent and free nation.
What do these different security strategies have in common? Fundamentally, they are all aimed at mobilising society and aligning the action of political leadership with clearly defined national interests.
As stated in the US National Security Strategy, ‘all Americans need to know what, exactly, it is we are trying to do and why’. Not every security strategy requires a detailed bureaucratic implementation plan; in some cases, it is more important to persuade the public or to reflect the expectations of society at a given moment.
The focus will not be on the promotion of art or creativity as such, but on soft power, historical memory and culture as instruments for defending and disseminating national interests.
Already in its introduction, the US National Security Strategy places considerable emphasis on international institutions. Some of these institutions are described as actively promoting outright anti-Americanism.
This framing suggests that prevailing attitudes within international organisations are unfavourable to the US, which explains why the US no longer perceives sufficient value in active participation in these formats. Notable examples include the US withdrawal from UNESCO and from the Paris Climate Agreement.
The US National Security Strategy identifies not only the state itself but also the American way of life as an object of protection. It is precisely this American way of life, and the values that constitute it, that can be conceptualised as soft power or, more broadly, as cultural identity.
The American way of life is commonly associated with individualism and self-reliance, a strong work ethic, a culture of consumption and comfort, personal freedom and the enduring promise of the American Dream - that anyone can succeed.
The strategy explicitly quotes destructive propaganda and cultural subversion as risks to national security. Unsurprisingly, when cultural subversion is identified as a threat, the document proposes to dismantle so-called DEI policies - diversity, equity and inclusion initiatives aimed at creating fair and representative environments. DEI is portrayed as a form of degradation of US institutions that must be halted.
At the same time, the strategy asserts that America’s unrivalled soft power has a positive global impact and helps secure US interests worldwide. The strategy states the US ‘will be unapologetic about our country’s past and present while respectful of other countries’ differing religions, cultures and governing systems’.
However, effective soft power can exist only if Americans themselves believe in the inherent greatness and historical mission of their country. The veneration of national heroes is therefore presented as essential to fostering optimism and collective pride. Without a long-term sense of security, the rebirth of cultural health is impossible.
How does the US intend to achieve its objectives? Among the nine key instruments outlined in the Strategy, particular emphasis is placed on the country’s unmatched soft power and cultural influence. The courage and patriotism of the American people are highlighted as central resources.
These principles are not merely rhetorical. The US has begun reviewing museum exhibitions to prevent the dissemination of what are described as ‘inappropriate ideologies’, while also reshaping the governance of institutions responsible for historical memory. Federal support for art has declined, whereas increased attention is being devoted to historical figures, their commemoration and the creation of ideologically acceptable symbolic narratives.
I will refrain from evaluating these initiatives aimed at strengthening historical memory. However, it is evident that symbolic politics now receive greater emphasis than contemporary cultural production or creative experimentation.
By elevating and defending the American way of life in its Security Strategy, the US implicitly raises similar expectations for its allies. Europe is especially encouraged to restore its self-confidence and reaffirm its Western identity. According to the strategy, Europe’s perceived lack of self-confidence also shapes its relationship with Russia.
The strategy highlights concerns about censorship of free speech and expression in Europe, as well as the suppression of political opposition, cratering birthdates and a loss of national identities. The US expresses support for the strengthening of European patriotic political forces, to help Europe to ‘correct its current trajectory’.
The Strategy says that the US expects its own interests to be prioritised - not only by Europe, but also by other partners. As stated in the document, ‘The world works best when nations prioritise their interests’. The supremacy of the nation is reaffirmed, and the nation-state is described as the core political unit of the international system.
It is therefore not surprising that US Vice-President J.D. Vance criticised Europe’s approach to freedom of expression at last year’s Munich Security Conference. Or similarly that US representatives travelled to Hungary to express support for Viktor Orbán during elections. It is also conceivable that similar support could be extended to political forces such as Marine Le Pen’s party in France or the AfD in Germany in future.
Is such engagement genuinely motivated by concern for freedom of expression? Is this vision of Europe what we are willing to achieve? The concept of freedom of speech has been stretched so broadly - to both left and right - that it is increasingly difficult to distinguish between legitimate expression and manipulation.
In any case, it is evident that the United States is acutely aware of the importance of soft power and actively employs it as an instrument of security policy. Russia, too, has been doing so aggressively for decades. Ultimately, the use of soft power by major powers underscores its growing role as a core instrument of modern security policy, shaping geopolitical influence far beyond the battlefield.